Dates |
Affirmative votes |
Negative votes |
Abstentions |
16 October 2023 |
5 |
1 (US) |
6 |
18 October 2023 |
6 |
1 (US) |
8 |
18 October 2023 (Amendment) |
7 |
1 (US) |
7 |
18 October 2023 (Amendment) |
12 |
1 (US) |
2 |
25 October 2023 |
10 |
3 (China, Russia) |
2 |
25 October 2023 |
4 |
2 (US, UK) |
9 |
15 November 2023 |
12 |
0 |
3 (US, UK, Russia) |
15 November 2023 |
5 |
1 (US) |
9 |
8 December 2023 |
13 |
1 (US) |
1 (UK) |
22 December 2023 |
13 |
0 |
2 (US, Russia) |
10 January 2024 |
11 |
0 |
4 (China, Russia) |
20 February 2024 |
13 |
1 (US) |
1 (UK) |
22 March 2024 |
11 |
3 (China, Russia) |
1 |
25 March 2024 |
14 |
0 |
1 (US) |
18 April 2024 |
12 |
1 (US) |
2 (UK) |
10 June 2024 |
14 |
0 |
1 (Russia) |
Source: United Nations Security Council UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables, URL: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2024 Accessed on 6 June 2024.
An examination of the resolutions and amendments and China’s stances on them is as follows:
- With the outbreak of the war, the UNSC tabled a draft resolution sponsored by Russia on 16 October 2023 that would have called for an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire in the ongoing Israel-Palestine crisis.” The resolution failed to be adopted due to vetoes cast by three P5 members- US, UK and France while China and Russia voted for the resolution. China’s representative Zhang Jun explained its stance that it “welcome(s) all initiatives conducive to protecting civilians,” and that the “maintenance of one’s own security cannot come at the cost of harming innocent civilians.” He expressed concern about Israel’s full siege of the Gaza Strip and the “collective punishment” of people in Gaza. His statement also referred to avoiding a “large-scale conflict and humanitarian disaster” for the sake of regional and international stability. Then he called for seeking “consensus” in the Council and for an “independent State of Palestine as the solution.”
- On 18 October 2023, in the aftermath of an Israeli air strike on a Gaza hospital, Brazil tabled a UNSC draft resolution that would have called for “humanitarian pauses to allow full, safe and unhindered access for UN agencies and their partners.” While it failed to be adopted due to veto cast by US, China voted for the resolution. Furthermore, two amendments by Russia to the draft text were also rejected due to negative votes by US, while China supported both the amendments. Expressing disbelief and disappointment with the results of the voting, Zhang “condemned the air strike and urged Israel to abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law.” He further called on the “Council to play its role.”
- On 25 October, two draft resolutions addressing the conflict and the humanitarian crisis were tabled at the Council- one from US and the other from Russia. However, both failed to be adopted due to vetoes cast by Russia and China on the former and by US and UK on the latter. Zhang criticized US’ draft that it “included divisive elements that went beyond the humanitarian realm,” that suggestions proposed by China, Russia, Brazil and UAE were ignored, thus resulting in a draft that was “out of balance” and “evasive on the urgent issue of ending the fighting.”
- On 15 November, the UNSC adopted a resolution calling for urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and immediate release of hostages. While US, UK and Russia abstained, China voted for the resolution. Explaining his support for the resolution, Zhang noted that China “welcomed any initiative to protect civilians and ease the humanitarian crisis,” and urged the UNSC to “stand on the side of justice.” He noted the “repeated obstruction of a Permanent member,” — the US — for the failure to have adopted this resolution earlier and acknowledged that the adopted resolution “can serve as only a first step, based on minimum consensus.” Prior to the adoption, the Russian Federation’s delegate introduced an amendment, which was defeated due to US veto and 9 abstentions (including UK and France) while China voted in favor (alongside Brazil, Mozambique, Russian Federation and UAE).
- On 8 December, the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution that would have demanded an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza due to a veto cast by the US. Expressing disappointment at the veto, Zhang pointed out the “double standards” of the US “condoning” the “continuation of fighting while claiming to care about the lives and safety of people in Gaza,” “advocating for the prevention of the spill-over effects of the conflict,” and “making references to the protection of women and girls and human rights.”
- On 22 December, the UNSC appointed a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid in Gaza. China voted in favor of the resolution while US and Russia abstained. Expecting “urgent action to be taken,” China expressed hope that the monitoring mechanism will be put in place. Noting however that a ceasefire “can prevent political settlement prospects from being completely destroyed,” China’s representative said that China voted in favor of the Russian Federation’s proposed amendment (which the US vetoed and which had called for an urgent suspension of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access).
- On 10 January 2024, the UNSC adopted a resolution demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels. China abstained on this resolution, along with Russia. Noting that certain revisions were “not incorporated,” Zhang stated that the text “remains ambiguous on several key issues,” and expressed “concern that it might not achieve its intended effect — or might even lead to negative consequences and further escalate regional tensions.” Rationalizing China’s abstention as such, he called on the Houthis to “abide by the resolution and on relevant parties to play a constructive role to ease tensions in the Red Sea.”
- On 20 February 2024, the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution that would have “demanded an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza” due to US veto, while China voted in favor. Rejecting the US claim that “the text would interfere with diplomatic efforts,” China expressed that the continued avoidance of an immediate ceasefire is “nothing different from giving a green light to the continued slaughter,” while adding that a ceasefire can prevent the conflict from “engulfing the entire region.”
- 0n 22 March, the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution that would have “determined the imperative of an immediate and sustained ceasefire in Gaza” due to vetoes cast by China and Russia. China noted that the resolution was “ambiguous and does not demand an immediate ceasefire — nor does it even answer the question of realizing a ceasefire — a clear deviation from the consensus of Council members.” Hence, China explained its veto as “to safeguard the UN Charter, and in recognition of the strong position of the Arab States,” while claiming that it had supported a resolution tabled on 20 February the same year that the US vetoed and which had enjoyed “overwhelming consensus” among the UNSC members.
- On 25 March, the UNSC adopted a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan, by a vote of 14 in favour while US abstained, “leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire.” While stating that the draft resolution “reflects the international community’s general expectations and enjoys the collective support of Arab States,” China’s delegate stated that “those countries jointly rejected the previous one.” While calling out US for making “accusations against China,” he noted that the “eyes of the international community are open and discerning.”
- On 18 April, the UNSC blocked a draft resolution that would have recommended granting full UN membership to State of Palestine due to US’s veto. The recommendation received 12 votes in favor, including China, France and Russia, while UK abstained. China’s representative termed it “unacceptable that some countries are challenging Palestine’s eligibility for membership.” He pointed out that those countries had made “direct negotiations between Palestine and Israel a prerequisite” for Palestine’s UN membership on the claim that it can only be the result of negotiations. He proverbially analogized this to “putting the cart before the horse,” i.e., it was the wrong order of resolving the issue.
- On 10 June 2024, the UNSC adopted a resolution proposing a “comprehensive three-phase ceasefire deal to end the war in Gaza,” urging both Israel and Hamas to implement it “fully and without delay and condition.” US (the sponsor of the proposal), China and 13 other member nations supported the deal whereas Russia abstained. China’s representative, noting that the draft text is still “ambiguous in many aspects,” expressed skepticism over the realization of the proposed goals. Nevertheless, acknowledging the “urgent need to stop more killings and alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe,” he stated that China voted in favor. Stressing upon the “sponsor” to work “sincerely” to push for an “immediate realization of a permanent ceasefire,” he asserted that it will work towards bringing the Israeli-Palestinian question “back to the right track” of the two-State solution.
As China’s stances on the resolutions showed, it consistently voted in a manner that was supportive of Palestine, which is in consonance with the stances of most Arab countries. China clearly stated that its position was to align with the “strong position of the Arab States.” By aligning its position with that of the Arab countries, China showed solidarity to them in order to garner goodwill and in turn gain political support from them. Moreover, it is not just the Arab countries that China is seeking to gather political support from via such a stance. Most Global South countries also share solidarity for Palestine. This stance assumes significance in the context of how China is increasingly trying to position itself as a leader and champion of the Global South. While one part of the strategy to win the Global South is through development finance, the other is through diplomatic support at multilateral institutions such as the UN in order to garner reciprocal support from and influence in these countries. This strategy will help China attain numerous goals such as “access to raw materials; develop new markets; garner political support; and bolster China’s diplomatic, security, and economic influence on the world stage.” (Centre for China Analysis, 2024, January 30) China’s support for the Global South countries is also reflected in its support for resolutions sponsored by countries such as Brazil, UAE, Malta etc. Furthermore, by explaining its stances that suggestions made by these countries were not taken into account in some resolutions, China again appeared to stand up for them.
In contrast, US has consistently taken a position that is in opposition to that of the Global South countries. For instance, the resolution adopted on 25 March 2024 enjoyed maximum support [14-1 (US abstained)] whereas the previous one and others proposed by US and its allies faced rejection, including from China citing divisiveness, imbalance, ambiguity and lack of consensus. As such, China seems to be taking advantage of the contrasting positions to “use” such conflicts as “opportunities” to undermine the US and gain support in the “Global South.” (Singh, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2023, November 29) As Lu also concurs, with US facing “fierce pushback over its support of Israel,” China has “seized the opportunity to align itself” with the Global South, which has “overwhelmingly condemned Israel’s actions, sharply diverging from the US position.” (Foreign Policy, 2024, January 31) Recurrent US vetoes presented a chance for China to criticize US on numerous occasions for causing “repeated obstruction” to many resolutions calling for cease-fire or humanitarian pauses to the war. China even charged US of being “hypocritical” by allowing the war to go on while claiming to care for the people in Gaza or for human rights. This may be understood as a retaliatory retort against US in the backdrop of how China has borne the brunt of US’s accusations on China over human rights issues. US has imposed several sanctions on China over its alleged “human rights abuses and atrocities in Xinjiang.” (Madhani, Associated Press, 2021, December 16) China’s statements reprimanding US actions denotes its attempts at painting US as a less responsible power too concerned for its own interests that it is unwilling to cooperate to resolve the issue.
Moreover, apart from countries from the Global South, those from the Western world have also voiced their opposition to Israel’s attacks, as pointed out earlier. This implied that a growing number of countries are increasingly shifting their positions towards supporting Palestine. As of 22 May 2024, 146 countries formally recognised an independent state of Palestine. This goes to show that China’s stance is in growing convergence with the larger will of the international community, as opposed to the US’s divergence. It is apparent from the voting pattern (See table 1) that the US is becoming more isolated in support for Israel. China seems to be taking advantage of the shifting geopolitical dynamics to “frame the US as an aggressor unfairly dominating the current world order.” (McCarthy, CNN World, 2024, May 31)
Meanwhile, China supported most of the resolutions while it vetoed only against two. China’s high affirmative voting affinity with the rest of the UNSC members reflects its intention to stand with the larger part of the international community. China showed its support to not only the draft resolutions but also to their amendments demonstrating its willingness for maximum cooperation. Furthermore, China standing up for the larger body– the ten non-permanent members of the Council, rather than just the sponsors of the resolutions who are usually from among the Big Five and their allies, also shows its cooperativeness. This is further proof of China’s adherence to the collective security decision-making mechanism of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security. As such, China’s stances have been perceived as a move to be seen as the “more responsible global superpower” vis-à-vis the US (The Guardian, 2023, November 9). Moreover, US is doing enough damage by itself for China to “mostly hang[ing] back and let[tting] US collect abuse.” (Jon B. Alterman as quoted in Lu, Foreign Affairs, 2024, January 31) As China frequently says, “time is on our side,” it might be in China’s strategy to “bide the time[iv]” for US’s own gradual decline, and achieve power transition peacefully to establish itself as the dominant power.
China’s stance in solidarity to the Global South also posed as resistance to Western dominance in the UNSC. China’s stances have given them “a better chance to maintain a balance of power,” and thus in resisting “domination” by the U.S-led West (Cheng, 2018, p. 39). Chinese scholars argue that China is “helping the world's poor to resist the world's rich.” (Chan, 2013, p. 55) Moreover, China’s approach to international responsibilities, besides maintaining international order, is also rooted in its understanding that “world stability and prosperity cannot be achieved unless developing countries can progress.” (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021, December 16) Thus China’s stance in support of the Global South countries, in its perspective, was a matter of discharging its international responsibility to bring about a more balanced and stable world order.
China also consistently sought consensus in the UNSC which implied seeking the will of the larger international community, rather than the domination of the few great powers. A case is made by Chinese scholars that China’s consensus-seeking stance reflects China’s respect for the “unity of the Council” and thus the sanctity of the UN Charter, which emphasizes reaching consensus while adopting resolutions. This in turn may be perceived as a testament of China’s commitment to the world order which was built on the UN Charter. Thus, in this context, China’s responsibility as an emerging power and a member of the international community is sought to be foregrounded. As such, the UN serves as “the central platform from” which China seeks to project itself as a “responsible power that fulfils its obligations toward the international community by respecting universal rules of international conduct.” (Odgaard, 2012, p. 132)
China’s respect for international rules of conduct may also be perceived from its expression of condemnation rather than concern — China’s usual choice of word while making its remarks on international crises — when it called out Israel to adhere to “international humanitarian law” in the aftermath of Israel’s air strike. China strongly opposes military action and views use of force as irresponsible behavior. For instance, in the past, when China “opposed military intervention in Yugoslavia” in 1999, Chinese scholars attributed this as “partly to fulfill its responsibility of upholding international law.” (Jia Qingguo as quoted in Chan, 2013, p. 61) Hence even as the resolution tabled on 18 October 2023 calling for humanitarian pauses failed to be adopted due to US’s veto, China expressed the strong word of condemnation to the military strike and emphasized adherence to international humanitarian law, to pose as a responsible nation that respects international law.
In the backdrop of US’s increasing isolation in the UNSC, China’s stances may be perceived as an “attempt to forge global partnerships in opposition to the US.” (Yu, Chatham House, 2024, May 17) The most significant of such partnerships is the one between China and Russia. This is apparent in China’s voting pattern which is marked by support for Russia-sponsored resolutions and an alignment of its stances to those of Russia’s. Such stances are reflective of their common threat perception from the US-led West. The threat perception, in turn, stems from the West’s containment policies towards China and Russia. As such, China’s “long-term alignment with Russia is increasingly bound to their common resentment of US hegemony.” (Ibid) China-Russia joint stances therefore served to “counterbalance US dominance” in the Council. The joint stances also reflect the great power rivalry between the US-led West on one side (P3- US, UK and France) and China and Russia (P2) on the other as these two blocs of power take their stands on the crisis in opposition to one another’s. Western powers, except France, were seen to veto Russia-sponsored resolutions while China and Russia vetoed US-sponsored ones.
Despite China’s voting affinity with Russia, China in many instances chose not to side with it but took independent stances and chose to support resolutions which were sponsored by developing countries or were supported by most members of the Council. In other cases, China showed willingness to cooperate even on “minimum consensus”- a mark of pragmatic diplomacy. China’s cooperativeness is also discernable from the fact that China voted affirmatively to a US-sponsored resolution proposing a “three-phase ceasefire deal” despite China’s skepticism with “ambiguous” aspects of the draft text, for the sake of alleviating “humanitarian catastrophe.” While US and Russia refrained from fully supporting many resolutions and amendments by abstaining rather than voting in favor, China in several instances showed full support for both. Hence, China appeared to be more cooperative compared to US and Russia.
Throughout the resolutions listed, China abstained once- on a resolution demanding the Houthis to cease attacks on commercial vessels. Such a stance may be interpreted as a measured one. Houthis’ actions in the Red Sea posed a threat to commercial interests in the region to many countries, including China’s. Hence, it should have been in China’s interests to fully support the resolution with an affirmative vote. However, China has taken a mediated stance. The relatively limited impact of the Houthis’ actions to China’s economic interests in the region, China’s own “limited ability to intervene militarily and politically to exert influence on the Houthis and Iran,” and “little confidence in its ability in this sphere” could explain China’s cautious stance on this crisis in the Red Sea (Chaziza, The Diplomat, 2024, January 16). Thus, the abstention may explain China’s cautiousness. On the other hand, China pointed out that the resolution’s “ambiguities” might lead to an escalation of “regional tensions.” So, China may also have abstained for the sake of regional stability, which China has repeatedly stressed on while explaining its stances on many resolutions pertaining to the crisis. Thus despite China’s reservations with the content of the text, it nevertheless did not obstruct the passing of the resolution but merely pointed out its disagreements with the text. This measured approach of abstaining may be construed as China carefully balancing its interests of supporting a resolution that was against Houthis’ threat to its commercial interests and responsible behavior of safeguarding regional stability.
Conclusion
The current Gaza crisis presents a tricky situation for China. On one hand, the crisis poses a challenge to its growing interests in the Middle East; and on the other, it presents an opportunity for China to further other interests that also includes seeming like a responsible great power. Hence, China has taken efforts towards resolving the crisis. To that end, China has promoted dialogue and negotiations between the opposing sides, and provided humanitarian aid and rhetorical and diplomatic support to Palestine. Although it is in China’s interest to bring stability to the region, many analysts are skeptical of China’s ability to actually pull it off. For instance, Raymond Kuo, a political scientist at Rand Corporation, argued that China “still didn’t have strong enough influence in the deeply complex region to effect a real solution.” (As quoted in Davidson and Hawkins, The Guardian, 2023, November 8) Moreover, not only is China a relatively new player in the region but the issue area is close to US’s chest and thus China would not want to get involved in a manner that further jeopardize its already shaky relationship with US. As Jon B. Alterman, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, stressed on China’s concern that the Middle East is “well within the U.S. sphere of influence, and differences over the region could precipitate a U.S.-China conflict.” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024, April 19)
Notwithstanding the skepticisms to China’s ability to resolve the crisis, the fact that China has a lot to gain from being engaged with the peace process should likely motivate it to continue being engaged with it. The latest effort comes in the form of the “Beijing Declaration” which sought to achieve reconciliation and unity among the 14 Palestinian factions- a Chinese initiative which China’s ambassador to Qatar, Cao Xiaolin, has called an “important step towards resolving the Palestinian question and achieving stability in the Middle East.” (Cao, Al Jazeera, 2024, August 29)
The study of China’s stances on UNSC resolutions on the crisis reflected the dynamics of China trying to realize its interests and responsibilities. China’s approach to the crisis appeared to be a fusion of efforts designed to achieve both its interests and responsibilities. As far as the US-China great power competition is concerned, China seems to be faring better than US whose legitimacy as a world leader becomes increasingly lessened with Gaza’s worsening condition. Due to China’s stances that reflected common agreement with other countries, China is “naturally in a better position to argue that it is not in pursuit of particularistic national interests but common interests,” thereby also gaining “international legitimacy.” (Cheng, 2018, p. 2) A clear picture emerges- the US becoming increasingly isolated in support of Israel, while China converging with large parts of the international community that, in turn, induces to further its own interests. Arguably, China may have won the competition with US in seeming like the more responsible power. However, China is still far from actually realizing its great power responsibility of stabilizing the region to be able to term its power truly legitimate. Hence, China will have to intensify its efforts in fulfilling its responsibility in order to realize its ultimate goal of establishing itself as a great power in the Middle East, or even as the dominant power in the world. As such, Ayman Talal Yousef, a professor of international relations at the Arab American University in Jenin, said,
China's resolute stance in defusing this conflict has elevated its stature but it may need to capitalize on this momentum. Further investing in principled multilateralism will continue garnering goodwill and buttressing China's role as a stabilizing force for the collective good (as quoted in China Daily, 2024, May 14).
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the encouragement of my PhD supervisor, Professor Alka Acharya, in writing this article.
[i] In December 2023, South Africa filed a case of genocide against Israel at the International Court of Justice which found the allegation “plausible.”
[ii] States which face international isolation due to attributes deemed unacceptable by international standards such as poor human rights record.
[iii] Details of the draft resolutions as well as China’s statements for objection are cited from United Nations Security Council UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables, URL: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2024
[iv] A foreign policy strategy devised by former Chinese president Deng Xiaoping who advocated for China to patiently wait for the right time to realise its goals.
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