|
S.No |
Parameter |
Specification |
|
1 |
Name of the system |
Long-range anti-ship hypersonic missile (LR-AShM) |
|
2 |
Developer |
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) |
|
3 |
Programme |
Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) |
|
4 |
Missile Type |
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)/Anti-Ship Missile |
|
5 |
Main Function |
Anti-ship/Sea-denial/ Coastal defence strike |
|
6 |
Launch Platform |
Land-based TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher) |
|
7 |
Range |
1000-1500 km |
|
8 |
Speed (Peak) |
Up to Mach 10 |
|
9 |
Trajectory Type |
Boost-glide / quasi-ballistic trajectory |
|
10 |
Propulsion |
Two-stage solid-fuel rocket booster/unpowered glide vehicle |
|
11 |
Target Capability |
Moving and stationary maritime targets |
|
12 |
Operational Status |
Tested (20232024); in induction phase |
Sources: Author’s compilation based on PIB/DRDO releases and corroborating media reports.
Kinetic Energy Assessment
India’s LR-AShM can cause damage using kinetic energy, independent of its explosive warhead. It is possible due to its high speed and precise strike guidance. The destruction potential at hypersonic velocities can be calculated using the mass of the missile reported to have been launched, 12,000 kg (Menon, 2026), and the classical kinetic energy equation.
Kinetic Energy Formula
KE=1/2 mv2
KE is the kinetic energy
m is the mass of the object
v is the velocity of the object
Sample Calculation at Mach 5
Mass (m) = 12000 kg
Velocity (v) at Mach 5 
1701.45m/s
KE at Mach 5 17.37GJ
TNT Equivalent
1 ton of TNT releases 4.184×109 joules
The TNT equivalent is:
TNT equivalent at Mach 5 4.151 tonnes
The table below shows the TNT equivalent for kinetic energy generated by the LR-AShM flying at different speeds.
Table 2: Kinetic Energy and TNT Equivalent of LR-AShM at Different Speeds
|
Speed (Mach) |
Velocity (m/s) |
Velocity (km/h) |
Kinetic Energy (GJ) |
TNT Equivalent (tonnes) |
|
5 |
1701.45 |
6125.22 |
17.37 |
4.151 |
|
6 |
2041.74 |
7350.26 |
25.01 |
5.978 |
|
7 |
2382.03 |
8575.31 |
34.04 |
8.137 |
|
8 |
2722.32 |
9800.35 |
44.47 |
10.628 |
|
9 |
3062.61 |
11025.40 |
56.28 |
13.451 |
|
10 |
3402.90 |
12250.44 |
69.48 |
16.606 |
Sources: Author
To compare, a 2,000 lb Mk 84 general-purpose bomb, filled with 945 lbs (429 kg) of Tritonal high explosive, has an explosive yield of about half a ton (0.5 tonnes) of TNT (MotoArt, 2016). The kinetic contribution of the LR-AShM alone is 8 times greater than that of a Mk 84, even at Mach 5. The kinetic energy at Mach 10 is comparable to that of almost 33 Mk 84 bombs detonating simultaneously. This comparison illustrates the theoretical kinetic energy potential of hypersonic impacts, though this represents an upper-bound estimate.
The LR-AShM is a two-stage, solid-fueled system in which the first booster stage is expended and separates upon burnout. Therefore, the mass of the launch at 12,000 kg (12 tons) is the mass of the entire missile and the booster stage. The terminal impact mass, which includes the glide vehicle and warhead only, is probably much less. Thus, the values of kinetic energy above are an upper limit. Real impact energy can be less, but still orders of magnitude greater than conventional anti-ship missiles.
Boost-Glide Phenomenology
Boost-glide vehicles (BGVs) operate according to a three-stage phase derived from open-source aerodynamics and weapons literature. The boost phase is the propulsion of the rocket to endo-atmospheric or exo-atmospheric apogee at 100 to 150 kilometres altitude, where the vehicle attains the velocity and altitude required to continue glide (J. M. Acton, 2015). The glide phase starts when reentry occurs, and lift-to-drag ratios (L/D) allow sustained manoeuvres that are unique to HGVs compared to conventional ballistic missiles. Skip-glide variants may be used in the last phase to make several hops of 3-5 cycles, generating the large cross-range deviation that makes defence difficult (Fetter, Thies, & Mizin, 2024).
The ionisation of air surrounding the vehicle during reentry can result in plasma blackout, which can frustrate datalinks, but open sources are divided on duration and impact. There are analyses indicating that blackout is between 10 and 30 seconds, and some claim that modern phased-array radars with enough power can operate in plasma (Ludwig Besser & Dennis, 2017). In the case of LR-AShM, the terminal phase would probably be low-altitude sea-skimming to avoid radar detection due to the curvature limitations of the Earth, and evasive manoeuvres to avoid CIWS. This flight profile is similar to operational hypersonic anti-ship missiles around the world, such as Zircon in Russia and YJ-21 in China. The DRDO officially describes the LR-AShM as a hypersonic glide vehicle (Defence Security Asia, 2026). Some external analysts classify it as a quasi-ballistic missile with enhanced skip-glide manoeuvrability, reflecting an ongoing technical debate in open-source literature (Tracy & Wright, 2020).
Platform Integration
The LR-AShM is mainly intended to be used in land-based coastal defence, manned by the Indian Navy on a 12x8 high mobility Tatra or BEML T815 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), which is publicly exhibited at the Republic Day parade on 26 January 2026 (Brahy, 2026). TELs have one missile in a closed launch canister and use a cold launch system with attitude control thrusters to safely egress before main motor ignition. The missile has a confirmed standoff range of over 1,500km, a top speed of Mach 10, an average speed of about Mach 5 and a quasi-ballistic, skip glide trajectory.
The weapon is likely to be deployed in strategic coastal positions, such as the Andaman & Nicobar Command and Lakshadweep, to aid sea denial operations against enemy carrier strike groups. The LR-AShM may be capable of threatening various classes of warships, potentially contributing to India’s sea denial capabilities (Indian Defence Research Wing, 2026a). In terms of future platforms, open-source reporting shows that ship-launched, air-launched (possibly on Su 30MKI or TEDBF), Army, and extended-range (3,500 km)variants are being developed or considered (“Long Range Anti-Ship Hypersonic Missile (LR-AShM),” 2026), but there is no official confirmation of current integration with any particular naval ship or submarine. As a result, the land-based coastal defence battery is the only confirmed operational configuration currently.
PLAN Carrier Vulnerabilities
The potential development of LR-AShM could alter the operational calculus of the PLAN’s CSGs in the IOR, constraining carrier operating areas and FOM within Indian A2/AD bastions. Carrier-based force projection in maritime strategy relies on sustained sortie generation rates (SGR) by uncontested flight decks, aided by layered self-defences including CIWS, vertical launch air defence (VLAD), and soft-kill electronic warfare (EW). Hypersonic weapons with Mach 5-10 speeds and skip-glide terminal manoeuvres could potentially compress PLAN’s Carrier Air Defence Identification Zones (CADIZ), constraining operations in littoral environments.
Liaoning (Type 001)
In 2012, the first aircraft carrier commissioned in China was Liaoning (former Soviet Varyag). It has a STOBAR design with a 14-degree ski jump. Open sources indicate a maximum of 24 J-15 sorties per day, and payload penalties because of ski-jump launch limitations. The J-15, a derivative of the Su-33 Flanker-D, cannot take off from the ski jump with full fuel and weapons load, typically sacrificing either range or payload. Liaoning’s CADIZ would shrink considerably against hypersonic threats. A Mach 5-10 weapon closing at 1.7 to 3.4 kilometres per second would be detected at a range of perhaps 30-40 kilometres by surface radars (because of curvature effects) and would have a range of less than 12 seconds to engage terminal defences (“Liaoning Type 001,” 2026). The reduced engagement window would potentially limit time for defensive measures, including fighter scramble and CIWS engagement.
Shandong (Type 002)
Shandong, commissioned in 2019, was China’s first indigenous carrier. It keeps the STOBAR design but with a larger flight deck and better hangar design. The sortie generation rate (SGR) is estimated at 32-36 J-15 sorties per day. The improved deck layout allows more efficient aircraft movement, yet the basic ski-jump constraint is still present. Although better than Liaoning, Shandong has the same fundamental weakness: STOBAR restricts J-15 take-off weight to about 12 tonnes, decreasing combat air patrol range and weapons load (Army Recognition Group, 2020). Sustaining a protective combat air patrol (CAP) over extended ranges could be challenged by hypersonic saturation attacks. A CSG facing LR-AShM threat would have to devote a greater portion of sorties to defensive CAP, which would decrease offensive strike capability (Army Recognition Group, 2025).
Fujian (Type 003)
Fujian launched in June 2022 and began sea trials in May 2024. It is the first CATOBAR carrier in China with an EMALS. It is estimated that SGR will be 60+ sorties per day with J-35 stealth fighters (China Daily, 2025). The J-35 is a fifth-generation stealth fighter similar to the F-35C, and is intended to operate in CATOBAR missions. EMALS enables the launching of fully loaded fighters, which enhances range and payload. However, the maturity of EMALS integration is somewhat of a threat to single-point failure. U.S. experience with EMALS on the Gerald R. Ford class has shown significant reliability challenges. If one of the catapults survives a near-miss or a fragmentation-type warhead, the launch cycles could be cut by 50 per cent or more (Servaes, 2025). Moreover, the EMALS can be observed by Indian electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems, which will give targeting indicators.
Escort Vulnerabilities: Type 055 and Type 052D
The Type 055 (Renhai) class of cruisers in the PLAN is armed with 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, usually 64 forward and 48 aft, with the ability to launch HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, and YJ-21 hypersonic ballistic missiles (Wertheim, Washington, D.C., area, & Biography, 2023). The Type 052D destroyers have 64 VLS cells each, and are reported to have a mix of HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, and CY-5 anti-submarine missiles (S. Nicanci, 2026). A carrier is escorted by one to two Type 055 and two to three Type 052D in a typical carrier strike group, which offers a total of 240-350 cells of VLS (Xuanzun & Rui, 2026). After the air defence missiles are used up, they must be replenished by Underway Replenishment (UNREP) operations, which are vulnerable. The HHQ-9 missile is operationally tested against ballistic and supersonic targets, but has not been tested against hypersonic glide vehicles using skip-glide manoeuvres, which presents a critical gap in layered CSG defence.
CSG Operational Constraints
PLAN’s CSG has an estimated unrefuelled endurance of 10-14 days, according to open sources. China has Type 901 (45,000 tonnes) and Type 903 (23,000 tonnes) replenishment ships (Brahy, 2025). The Type 901 is specifically designed to assist carrier operations. UNREP is a critical vulnerability chain: ships are slower, less defended, and constrain CSG manoeuvrability during replenishment; a single LR-AShM strike on a Type 901 AOR could end CSG operations in the IOR (Praveen, 2017). This logistics dependency creates a potential vulnerability that India might exploit through persistent surveillance and responsive targeting.
IOR Operational Geometry
The LR-AShM operationalisation in the IOR shows the sea denial capabilities of the missile against PLAN ships. The Andaman-Nicobar Command’s position near the Malacca Strait exit (Hand, 2026), combined with LR-AShM’s reported 1,500-kilometre range (Indian Defence Research Wing, 2026b), could create significant operational constraints for carrier transiting the area: to pass through the strait, a CSG must enter the WEZ; to avoid the WEZ, a CSG must use longer routes (Sunda, Lombok) with their own limitations.
Figure 1: LR-AShM Sea Denial Envelope from Lakshadweep and Port Blair
Source: Google Earth Pro (2026). Satellite image [Software]. Available at: https://www.google.com/earth/ (Accessed: April 22, 2026). Imagery attribution: Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO; Image Landsat / Copernicus.
Chokepoint Analysis
The table below highlights major IOR chokepoints (Ballast Markets, 2025a) that are pertinent to PLAN’s CSG transit:
Table 3: IOR Chokepoints: Dimensions, Traffic Volumes and PLAN Relevance
|
S.No |
Chokepoint |
Minimum Width |
Maximum Depth |
2025 Annual Ship Transits (approx.) |
Relevance to PLAN |
|
1 |
Malacca Strait |
2.5 km |
25 m |
100,000+ |
80% of Chinese oil imports |
|
2 |
Sunda Strait |
24 km |
20-70 m |
10,000+ |
Alternative to Malacca |
|
3 |
Lombok Strait |
18 km |
250+ m |
12,000+ |
Deep-water access to Australia |
|
4 |
Strait of Hormuz |
50 km |
50-90 m |
21,000+ |
Gulf oil exports |
|
5 |
Bab El-Mandeb |
25 km |
30-150 m |
24,000+ |
Suez access |
Sources: Author’s compilation based on Ballast Markets reports and corroborating media reports.
LR-AShM claimed 1,500-kilometre range would cover from ANC positions, the entire exit of the Malacca Strait and much of the Andaman Sea (Ballast Markets, 2025b). This geographic configuration offers India a potential asymmetric advantage: land-based launchers could threaten PLAN transits without necessarily exposing naval forces to direct counterattack. The Malacca Strait is also shallow (down to 25 metres), which limits submarine operations, and the PLAN cannot use undersea resources to protect the CSG in this vital chokepoint (Ballast Markets, 2025c).
Andaman-Nicobar Command Geometry
ANC is the only joint tri-service command in India, which was formed in 2001. ANC is positioned on the main SLOC of China, which is located about 1,200 kilometres north of the northern exit of Malacca. The ANC has airfields at Port Blair (INS Utkrosh), Car Nicobar (INS Baaz and Campbell Bay), capable of accommodating fighter aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft and possibly LR-AShM launchers (Christopher Arputharaj & Yusuf, 2025). This capability represents a factor that PLAN planners would likely consider in IOR transit planning.
Calculations of Range and Endurance
With the reported minimum range of 1,000 km and the maximum estimated range of 1,500 km of the LR-AShM, the WEZ can be overlaid on strategic IOR coordinates. The distance between the Andaman & Nicobar Command headquarters at Port Blair (11.7°N, 92.8°E) and the exit of the Malacca Strait (around 6°N, 96°E) is about 1,150 km, which is well within the envelope of the LR-AShM. Port Blair is about 500 km away from the northern Andaman Sea (12°N, 95°E), which provides complete coverage of that basin. The western arc has a launch point at Lakshadweep/Kavaratti (10.5°N, 72.5°E), which covers the Arabian Sea, and the 1,500 km range of the missile is extended to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz approaches. In the case of air-launched variants, a Su-30MKI based in Car Nicobar will be able to reach the Malacca Strait entry point at a distance of about 800 km. Strikes by PLAN carrier strike groups in the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, or eastern Arabian Sea would be within LR-AShM’s WEZ. To remain beyond the reported LR-AShM engagement envelope, PLAN CSGs might be constrained to operating south of 5°S, limiting access to major SLOCs and logistics nodes.
UNREP Vulnerabilities
China does not have any foreign naval bases in the IOR that are similar to the U.S. bases at Diego Garcia. PLAN’s CSGs rely solely on UNREP to support long operations of more than about 10 days. China has been pursuing logistics access at Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Djibouti. None of these, however, are complete naval bases, able to maintain carriers or to replenish ammunition in large quantities (Sweeney, 2024). UNREP logistics chains are susceptible to interdiction. If India were able to target UNREP ships (Type 901/903) with LR-AShM or other anti-ship missiles, the endurance of PLAN’s CSG would be highly limited. A CSG that is unable to replenish must either go back to port (China), a 5-7 day transit each way, stay on station with reduced capabilities, or run the risk of UNREP in contested waters. Both alternatives undermine the capability of China to sustain IOR presence.
Strategic Recommendations
The maritime doctrine of India, reflected in the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2025 (IMD-25), focuses on multi-domain deterrence provided by layered A2/AD kill webs, with hypersonic effectors such as LR-AShM as high-end multipliers. This overmatch needs to be operationalised with strategic suggestions to use persistent sea denial, deter far-seas force projection, and stabilise IOR escalation ladders. The recommendations that follow are on integration, ISR fusion, operational hardening, and diplomatic off-ramps.
A2/AD Integration
Three priority steps must be undertaken by India to ensure the effectiveness of LR-AShM. The first step is to develop an A2/AD network with LR-AShM (long-range hypersonic), BrahMos (supersonic, 290 km range), and Nirbhay (subsonic loitering, 1,000 km range) (“BrahMos Anti-Ship / Cruise Missile - Defence Update,” 2006). This will create a kill web rather than a kill chain, and therefore, it is challenging for adversaries to architect their defence. Second, harden ANC launchers to counter-battery fire and pre-emptive attack. Mobile launchers, dispersal, and decoys are necessary. Third, develop forward resupply nodes at INS Baaz (Campbell Bay) for sustained time-sensitive targeting (TST). This decreases the response time to emerging targets and makes it difficult to assess battle damage by the adversary. These actions are in line with the focus of the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2025 on MDO. The doctrine explicitly calls for “integrated kill webs” and “persistent, networked, and responsive” targeting.
ISR and QUAD Synergies
India has the following ISR platforms that apply to hypersonic targeting: P-8I Poseidon (maritime patrol aircraft, 12 in service); MQ-9B Sea Guardian (leased by the U.S., 2 in service); NETRA Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&CS); and Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT) series radar imaging satellites. The Malabar exercises of QUAD involve MDA sharing and cooperative targeting exercises. Air defence exercises from the sea were conducted in the 2024 Malabar exercise (Christopher Arputharaj, 2026). ISR improvements have been recommended as: standardise data fusion protocols between QUAD members to hypersonic targeting, such as common data link standards and track numbering; expand QUAD MDA to real-time cueing of LR-AShM batteries; invest in indigenous AEW&C capability with Over-The-Horizon Targeting (OTHT); and allocate LR-AShM targeting cells to the ANC and Western Naval Command to provide prompt cueing and coordinated action.
Operational Measures
India holds regular exercises such as TROPEX (Theatre-level Operational Readiness Exercise, every two years) and Malabar (annual with QUAD partners) (Press Information Bureau, 2025). Operational integration recommendations would include: incorporate hypersonic live-fire or simulated engagements in Malabar 2026-2028; live-fire of LR-AShM against a target vessel (expendable) would confirm open-source performance estimates; create specific wargaming scenarios of PLAN’s CSG engagement in IOR chokepoints. Also, develop LR-AShM release authority, targeting, and battle damage assessment standard operating procedures (SOPs), including delegation of launch authority to theatre commanders to targets with time constraints. Lastly, perform routine LR-AShM launch drills by surface vessels and Su-30MKI aircraft to confirm operational preparedness and training of the crews.
Diplomatic Confidence-Building Measures
India and China have bilateral agreements, such as the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control (Joshi, 2020). There is no similar naval CBM in the IOR. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a platform of regional naval cooperation, with 25 member states (Kupriianov, 2020). China is, however, not a member. Naval CBM recommendations include: create an IOR naval hotline between the Indian Navy Western Naval Command and PLAN South Sea Fleet, similar to the India-Pakistan hotline; implement pre-notification agreements on CSG transits within 500 kilometres of each other’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); conduct observer exchanges during TROPEX and PLAN IOR exercises, beginning with low-sensitivity activities (Sawan, 2020). These CBMs minimise the risk of miscalculation without undermining the deterrent posture of India. This is not aimed at removing competition but to manage it below the threshold of armed conflict.
Conclusion
The LR-AShM is the first hypersonic anti-ship missile to be publicly shown in India, unveiled in January 2026 as part of the HSTDV programme. The main technical parameters are boost-glide trajectory, solid-fuel booster, and the reported range of 1,500 kilometres. Preliminary open-source analysis suggests LR-AShM could potentially reduce PLAN’s CADIZ and challenge current CIWS (Type 1130) engagement timelines. A weapon with Mach 5-10 could potentially reduce terminal engagement windows to less than 12 seconds, though this estimate is subject to significant uncertainty. The Andaman-Nicobar Command provides a geometric advantage in the control of the Malacca Strait, and the LR-AShM WEZ covers the entire strait exit. There are still considerable gaps in data: CEP, Pk, warhead weight, and countermeasure effectiveness are not publicly accessible. Any analysis that purports to give certain figures is speculative. PLAN carriers have common weaknesses: UNREP reliance, CIWS saturation limits, and EMALS integration maturity (Fujian). The primary strategic impact of LR-AShM may be deterrence through denial, potentially creating uncertainty for adversary operations.
If operationally deployed and integrated with QUAD’s ISR, LR-AShM could generate three strategic effects. First, strengthen India as a net security provider in the IOR without matching the number of carriers as China does. Second, ensure against the Malacca Dilemma coercion, such that any attempt to blockade would be expensive and unpredictable. Third, develop mutual hypersonic vulnerability with the YJ-21 of China, which may stabilise deterrence by the stability-instability paradox. These effects, however, are contingent on operational preparedness, ISR integration, and plausible political will to use the weapon during a crisis.
Disclosure Statements: The author states that this paper has neither been published nor submitted for publication, either in whole or in part, in a professional journal or as a part of a book which is formally published or for internal purposes in any institution, and has not been made available to the public. The author has no conflicts of interest. There are no financial or personal relations that have influenced the work. This research was not funded. It is part of the author’s PhD research from the Central University of Gujarat, Vadodara, India. In the event of acceptance, the author agrees to publish the manuscript in the Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies (ISSN online: 2582‑9645) and retains the right to publish such a publication in the journal, as per the journal’s policy. No AI tools were used for research content; QuillBot AI was used solely for grammar checking, and the author takes full responsibility for the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to acknowledge his PhD supervisor, Dr Amit Mukherjee of the Department of Strategic Technologies, for his academic guidance; Prof. Sanjay Kumar Jha, Dean, School of National Security Studies, for his support; and Dr Vishwas Raval, Head of the Department, for his encouragement. The author acknowledges the use of HPC-GIS Laboratory facilities of the DST-SNSS-CUG for the preparation of the article.
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