

Strategic Review: Unravelling the Dynamics of India's Nuclear Policy in the 21st CenturySaroj Meghwalⁱ & Ramesh Kumarⁱⁱ**Abstract**

The country that gains independence after a long period of slavery, fulfilling basic needs, is naturally a primary concern. India was an economically weak country at the time of its independence. Therefore, it was natural that it paid more attention to fulfil the basic needs of its citizens rather than its nuclear needs. Maintaining its policy of non-alignment, India established strong relations with both the Eastern and Western blocs. Attempts were made to portray India as defensively weak due to constant conflicts with neighbours like Pakistan and China. Nuclear test by China and Chinese and American patronage to Pakistan placed India in a security dilemma and led India to acquire nuclear weapons. However, India's purpose in acquiring nuclear weapons has never been to threaten or intimidate any other party and establish its influence, but to promote its domestic development and meet its security needs. It always opposes the unbridled race for nuclear arms. By keeping its civilian nuclear energy programmes and military programmes separate, it has avoided the illegal proliferation of nuclear technology.

In reality, India is in favour of acquiring only that much nuclear power to keep the nation free from any external attack. It has also clarified in its nuclear doctrine that if any part of India is attacked, India reserves the right to retaliate, and India ensures that this retaliatory attack will be completely unbearable for the attacker. By analysing some of these basic factors, an attempt has been made in this paper to highlight and analyse the theoretical nuances of India's nuclear policy.

Keywords: Minimum Credible Deterrent, Nuclear Command Authority, No First Use Policy, Nuclear Missiles, Nuclear Technology, Nuclear Weapons

ⁱ Saroj Meghwal is a Research Scholar at Department of Political Science, Central University of Haryana, Mahendergarh (Haryana), India

ⁱⁱ Dr Ramesh Kumar is a Professor at Department of Political Science, Central University of Haryana, Mahendergarh (Haryana), India

Introduction

Nuclear power is essential for the defence of any nation, without which it finds itself in trouble. India has often advocated for security guarantees from nuclear-armed nations, yet the issue has not received much attention. As a responsible nuclear state, India underscores its commitment never to attack a non-nuclear state that is not allied with any nuclear power, pledging to use its nuclear arsenal solely in response to nuclear aggression. In the event of a nuclear attack or threat against India, it would retaliate with its nuclear capabilities as an intolerable and unacceptable response. India prioritises bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Keeping its national interests in mind, India reaffirms its unwavering commitment to complete nuclear disarmament within a defined timeframe. India upholds its nuclear arsenal for deterrent purposes and advocates for responsible nuclear behaviour. At the same time, issues of non-proliferation, disarmament, and regional security dynamics remain critical components of the international nuclear framework. Regarding its nuclear capabilities, India officially adopted the Nuclear Doctrine in 2003, shaping and guiding all of its nuclear policies.

Evolution of India's Nuclear Doctrine

India's Nuclear journey began in the post-independence era, marked by the establishment of the *Atomic Energy Commission* in 1948. This approach was not just for the scientific process but also for pursuing strategic autonomy in an unstable global environment. To understand every aspect of Indian Nuclear Policy, it is divided into major parts, which are listed below:

Post-Independence Era

The nuclear era had already begun before India's independence in 1947, and the Cold War divided the world into two distinct groups. Indian leaders made crucial decisions to maintain their independence, freedom of decision, action, and self-reliance. They adopted a more difficult path, non-alignment, which means not joining either of the two factions. They constantly reaffirmed that India believes in disarmament and will not promote any arms race between nation-states. It is a significant plank in Indian foreign policy. In this context, Mr. Nehru's statement can be mentioned when addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April 1954, he said about nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power that these should not be used to make weapons of mass destruction. (GOI, 2010)

In the 1960s, nuclear weapons began to be frowned upon, and security concerns deepened. There was a constant security threat from India's neighbouring countries, like Pakistan and China, which culminated in the India-China War of 1962. China showed its dominance in Asia

by announcing a unilateral ceasefire. In 1963, the nations signed an agreement to stop atmospheric testing, but even then, the technology for underground nuclear tests had already been developed, and the nuclear weapons race was still going on. Due to the increasing security threats, it seems necessary to acquire nuclear weapons for India's national security.

Pokhran I and II

On May 18, 1974, a peaceful nuclear explosion was carried out in Pokhran (Rajasthan), which was named as *Operation Smiling Buddha*. An assurance was given to the global nations that India would use its nuclear capability only for peaceful purposes and that no nuclear weapon would be made from it. India's nuclear test in 1995 failed due to American satellites, which was later conducted in May 1998, named *Operation Shakti*. These nuclear tests were a significant event for India, justified by growing security concerns. Later on, Pakistan's nuclear test deepened global concern for nuclear disarmament. The international community condemned India and Pakistan. To prevent nuclear proliferation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in 1974. Several treaties, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), were introduced. Considering its national interests, India refused to sign them, calling them discriminatory.

Need for a Strong Nuclear Policy

Some countries in the world have developed nuclear weapons and have acquired more sophisticated delivery systems, and are constantly developing them. Undoubtedly, the modernization of nuclear weapons poses security threats and concerns to countries that do not possess these weapons. Now, a pattern has emerged regarding the covert acquisition of nuclear material, missiles, and related technology, which has made all the countries suspicious of the nuclear capabilities of other countries.

Nevertheless, India's commitment to a *No-First-Use Policy (NFU)* can be considered a courageous step. India can use this to resist pressure to sign any discriminatory international treaty, some are mentioned above, that affects its nuclear capability. India cannot admit a regime that creates an unscientific separation between *nuclear-weapon states* and *non-nuclear-weapon states* in the absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament. It believes every country has the right to decide its security interests. Even developing countries have been pushed back on the development path for years because of colonisation. They are attempting to bridge the technology gap formed by long years of colonial exploitation.

Security Imperatives

India's nuclear development was influenced by several developments in its security environment, as Das (Das, 2015) noted that the India - China War of 1962, China's test of nuclear weapons in 1964, the emergence of the Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, which sought to prevent the emergence of any new nuclear weapon states, America's direct inclination towards Pakistan in the Bangladesh war of 1971, etc. (P. 2). India formally declared itself a state armed with nuclear weapons by conducting a second nuclear explosion on May 13 and 14, 1998.

Shaping Factors and Influences

In the context of nuclear weapons, the no-first-use policy and the use of nuclear weapons by the Indian Army were issues that had been discussed and debated long before the 1998 nuclear tests.

Two of the most influential voices in promoting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India - General K. Sundar, who later went on to become the country's Chief of the Armed Forces, and K. Subrahmanyam, a civil servant who directed the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for nearly a decade and a half - were votaries of NFU policy (Ramana, 2018, p. 153).

Both of them were also included in the committees formed in the 1980s to advise the PM on the issue of nuclear weapons. The first group was formed in 1985 at the request of PM Rajiv Gandhi to assess the 'cost of nuclear deterrence' while the second was a study group set up in 1990 by PM V.P. Singh to 'devise procedures for effective control of the country's nuclear arsenal and other issues related to denuclearisation'. The report of these groups recommended that India create a minimum deterrent force under a strict principle of no first use, to be used only to retaliate against a nuclear attack on India (Ramana, 2018, p. 154).

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) secretary, Mr. Brijesh Mishra, released the draft of India's nuclear doctrine on August 17, 1999. The PM's Office issued India's official nuclear doctrine on January 4, 2003. The NSAB endorsed India's adherence to the NFU policy, but the third NSAB report expressed doubt about its NFU policy (O'Donnell, 2020, p. 423). The main difference between India's 1999 and 2003 nuclear policies is that the former established a retaliatory policy of punitive retaliation, while the latter included a policy of massive retaliation. The 2003 policy also included permission for India to use a nuclear first strike in response to chemical or biological attacks (O'Donnell, 2020, p. 415).

Some strategists have asked what the point of announcing such a policy is when enemy countries do not believe in such policies and do not even feel hesitant to use nuclear weapons at first. Here, India's Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar's statement given in 2016 can be mentioned, that, when I am a responsible nuclear power and I have clearly acknowledged that I will not use these weapons irresponsibly, then why should I bind myself? (Scroll Staff, 2016).

The response to this exists in India's retaliation and retribution strategy. Retaliation, as discussed above, can be operated only in response, while retribution is associated with a proportionate response. If the original wrongdoing or attack did not involve the use of nuclear weapons, the retaliation should also not involve the use of nuclear weapons (Ramana, 2018, p. 156).

In addition to this, in situations like a military crisis, India can use nuclear weapons first. In this context, PM Vajpayee's response to the Pakistani nuclear attack threat in February 2000 may be mentioned:

If they think we will wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken (Ramana, 2018, p. 160).

Describing NFU as a great initiative of Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, PM Modi said in an interview that NFU is a reflection of our cultural heritage, and there is no compromise on it. We are very clear about our nuclear doctrine. (Thomson Reuters, 2014). India's nuclear doctrine is a dynamic concept that will continue to evolve.

Key Tenets of India's Nuclear Doctrine

To understand India's nuclear doctrine, it is necessary to understand some of its main pillars, which are analytically described in the section below:

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons

The use of nuclear weapons is lethal and seen as a crime against humanity, which also violates the provisions of the UN Charter (Sarkar, 2020). India's no-first-use policy, which provides for the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack, appears to be a cultural choice rather than a strategic one. Under this, if there is a nuclear attack on any Indian territory or the Indian army anywhere, then India will respond by launching a nuclear attack to cause unacceptable damage on a large scale (Indian Express, 2019).

Credible Minimum Deterrent Doctrine (CMD)

The CMD is the second most crucial aspect of India's nuclear doctrine. This refers to the amount of nuclear force India needs to deter potential nuclear adversaries. However, there has been no consensus on how many nuclear weapons a country should have to deter its nuclear adversaries. This principle highlights assured destruction as a second-strike capability. Nuclear deterrence is not a game of numbers but a strategic approach. Its objective is achieved if the adversary is prevented from launching a nuclear attack and threatening to do so. As Kenneth Waltz used to say, "If less is enough, more is not better." Similarly, what matters for India is to find a rational way to determine how much is sufficient for India's nuclear deterrent (Kanwal, 2016, p. 11).

According to the draft released by India's NSAB, India's nuclear deterrence doctrine requires the country to have adequate, survivable, and operationally ready nuclear forces, strong command and control systems, effective intelligence capabilities, and extensive planning and training for operations by its strategy (Embassy of India, Washington DC, 1999). It is generally believed that deterrence is relatively complex unless a country has a nuclear weapons capability. Subrahmanyam wrote,

More important than the losses suffered by either side is how much punishment the opposing side can withstand (Embassy of India, Washington DC, 1999).

Undoubtedly, in the current scenario, there is no country which is worried about who will have to suffer more, but rather they are more concerned about how much suffering they may have to suffer in return.

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and Strategic Force Command (SFC)

The need for a practical and responsible command and control system was felt to prevent inadvertent activation and illegal use of nuclear weapons, avoid the risk of accidents, and ensure accountability. The NCA consists of two parts: One is the Political Council, headed by the Prime Minister of India, and the other is the Executive Council, headed by the National Security Advisor of India. Hence, the official power to use nuclear weapons and to decide on retaliatory nuclear attack action has been vested in the PM or his successor nominated by him. The Executive Council is entrusted with the task of providing critical inputs to the NCA and executing the directives given by the Political Council.

As a key part of the NCA, the SFC manages and administers the country's stockpile of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The sole authority to manage the country's nuclear arsenal rests with the Commander-in-Chief of the SFC. Lieutenant General-rank officers of the three armies have the opportunity to lead in rotation.

Main Objectives of India's Nuclear Doctrine

India, fully committed to promoting world peace and resolving disputes through diplomatic means. It is fully committed to achieving the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world, with "global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament being a key national security objective under its nuclear policy" (Embassy of India, Washington DC, 1999). India's nuclear capability has been recognised as the right of self-defence under the Charter of the UN. India's doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence and policy of preventive response to a nuclear attack are dynamic concepts relating to the survivability of our arsenal and national security. The objective of the nuclear policy of India is to deter any potential aggressor from threatening to use nuclear weapons against India, and to assure the aggressor that if nuclear weapons are used or threatened to be used against India, a punitive response will be given, which will inflict unbearable damage on the aggressor (Embassy of India, Washington DC, 1999). As Mr. Karnad stated, "A relatively large-robust nuclear deterrent...would lead to a genuinely independent strategic role for India" (Rajagopalan, 2016, p. 9). India will not launch an initial nuclear attack but will respond with punitive reprisal if such an attack occurs and deterrence fails.

India's Approach to Nuclear Disarmament

Today, the world is sitting on such a pile of nuclear weapons that a single spark can destroy the entire world. A nuclear-free world is not only necessary for India's security but also essential for global peace. India continues to participate in relevant multilateral fora and work with partner countries on international security, nuclear disarmament, and non-proliferation matters (Sarkar, 2020). It has consistently been and will continue to be at the forefront of the call to initiate dialogue to adopt a comprehensive, universal, and non-discriminatory approach to disarmament. Indian nuclear policy has always taken a positive stance regarding the use of nuclear weapons, which has been the cornerstone of our doctrine. At present, to end the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, India is continuously pushing both countries to find a solution through the round table of negotiation. During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2021-22, India also engaged with relevant UN committees on specific matters related

to measures on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Besides this, India is also a member of many international export control regimes that continuously work on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, etc.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Regimes

India's involvement with the global non-proliferation regimes played an important role in shaping India's nuclear doctrine and international stance. Some are presented below in an analytical view:

The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)

India has expressed its willingness to join the NSG group many times. It applied in 2016, but even today, it is not a member of the group. China opposes to the membership of India as it is not a signatory of the NPT. The Biden administration reiterated its support for the Indian NSG membership and its commitment to continue engagement with like-minded partners to advance this goal (Laxman, 2023).

NSG members must respect safeguards and export controls, and nuclear supplies must be in accordance with the NSG Guidelines. The NSG is an ad hoc export control regime (PTI, 2018).

India has been successful in obtaining cooperation from various countries in nuclear weapons without NSG membership, notable among them being the India-US civil nuclear agreement/123 Agreement in 2008, and India-Japan signing a civil nuclear agreement in 2016 (Dawn, 2016). The US also promised to help India get a waiver from the NSG. Such nuclear agreements with the West gave India access to nuclear technology after a long period of isolation.

India has constantly reiterating its position that it will not share sensitive nuclear material or related technology with others and will maintain its voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Due to this, the NSG group agreed to give India an explicit exemption from its existing rules, which ban nuclear trade with nations that are not signatories of the NPT. This special exemption given to India reflects the recognition of India as a responsible nuclear country

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The CTBT comprehensively prohibits nuclear weapons tests or nuclear explosions, and calls each member country to prevent nuclear explosions at any location within its territory of control and not to encourage any nuclear weapon tests. Refrain from participating in the process of carrying out any nuclear explosion, etc. It has neither been signed nor ratified by India, Pakistan, and North Korea (Gopalaswamy, 2010, p. 2). Somewhere, one of the main reasons for India not signing this treaty is that it may limit its ability to develop its own nuclear assets, which may have an undesirable impact on its national security. Hence, it always supports an international legal system in which all countries should be treated equally and always emphasizes the concept of just and comprehensive nuclear disarmament that is acceptable to all countries.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology. Along with Israel and Pakistan, India decided to stay out of the treaty to keep its nuclear option open. According to this treaty, only those countries that conducted nuclear tests before 1967 are included in the nuclear-weapon states. India has called this treaty unfair because it does not put any obligation on the nuclear-weapon states to give them up. In contrast, non-nuclear countries are not allowed to keep them, which shows that this treaty is discriminatory. Also, no fixed deadline for disarmament has been mentioned.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The MTCR was introduced in April 1987 by seven industrialised nations, including the US, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, Germany, and Italy. Currently, it has 35 members, including India. This is not a legally binding treaty but merely an informal political understanding.

Under this, a nuclear-capable missile was defined as a missile capable of carrying at least 500 kilograms of warhead to a range of 300 kilometres or more (NTI, 1987).

The main objective of the MTCR is to prevent non-nuclear countries from acquiring information and technology related to intercontinental ballistic missile technology. India became a member of MTCR in 2016. This membership is beneficial in a strategic sense, i.e., Indian arms exports will increase, and it can now export Brahmos to other countries. It can now access restricted high-end technologies to develop its own cryogenic engines. This membership has simplified the procurement of high-tech weapon systems and defence equipment for India,

such as the S-400, for which a contract was signed between India and Russia for five S-400 missile squadrons in the year 2018-19. Membership of the MTCR gives India international recognition as a responsible nuclear state and also paves the way for India to join other major containment regimes such as the NSG.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA is the principal agency for promoting cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensuring that it is not used for military purposes.

The principal objective of the Agency is to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world” and to ensure, so far as it is able, “that assistance provided by it or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose” (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.).

Under the *Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005*, India agreed to keep all its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In return, the US agreed to work towards assistance in the civil nuclear sector. One of the main conditions of this deal is that India never conduct any nuclear test in the future; not only will this treaty be cancelled, but the equipment and materials provided to India by America during this treaty will have to be returned. This deal is criticised because it has curbed India’s nuclear option. India contributes to many IAEA activities, such as providing experts, conducting training programs, and supporting initiatives such as (PACT).

India is one of the founder members of the IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles- INPRO, and contributes US\$50,000 annually toward the program (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.).

During his visit to India on October 23, 2023, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said,

Nuclear energy and technology play a big role in India’s development, benefiting its people. We aim to strengthen our collaboration with India further to maximise the potential of initiatives, such as *Rays of Hope* and *Atoms4Food* (IAEA, 2023).

The present partnership between India and the IAEA can play an essential role in making ‘Nuclear for Peace and Development’ a reality.

Dynamics of India’s Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century

Some principles of India's nuclear policy appear impractical; the NFU principle does not seem to be a strategic decision for India, but rather a reflection of its cultural values. It is not feasible for nuclear weapons to be exclusively designed for a second-strike capability. On the one hand, the commitment to the NFU principle is mainly concerned with the fact that not striking first could cause significant deterrent harm. On the other hand, it can also be considered a bold step because when other countries secretly increase their armaments and modernise them, India is still trying to establish a peaceful system. Based on this policy, India reflects its traditional aversion to nuclear weapons and reiterates its support for nuclear disarmament. In Manpreet Sethi's opinion, the most important advantage is that "it obviates the need for the expensive nuclear weapons infrastructure that is associated with a first-use doctrine" (Rajagopalan, 2016, p. 4). But as Bharat Karnad argues (Rajagopalan, 2016) A policy of NFU is viable only when a country has full confidence not only in the survivability of its national nuclear forces, sufficient to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike, but also in the effectiveness of its crisis management system (P.5).

Indian Nuclear doctrine is also frequently debated regarding the command-and-control system in India. The full official power to decide on retaliatory nuclear attack in case of a nuclear attack on India was given to the Political Council under the NCA. India's nuclear operational capability is called questionable by critics due to inadequate powers to make the right decision at the right time. As Koithara explains (Rajagopalan, 2016) A higher level of operationalisation and greater military involvement in nuclear matters is necessary for strong deterrence and safe operations under alert situations (P. 11). In pursuance of this, ensuring a solid and transparent nuclear command structure, including a clearly defined succession plan and communication protocols, is essential to protect India's national security interests (Joshi, 2022).

The nuclear-armed nations have never disclosed the size of their nuclear arsenal, and some nations, like Israel, do not even publicly acknowledge their possession of nuclear weapons.

According to SIPRI, China increased its nuclear arsenal to 410 in January 2023 from 350 in January 2022, which may increase further. It is increasingly difficult to square this trend with China's declared aim of having only the minimum nuclear force needed to maintain its national security (SIPRI, 2023).

After Qatar, India was the second biggest importer of major arms during 2022. India's arms imports declined by about 11 per cent between 2013-17 and 2018-2021 due to complex procurement processes, efforts to replace imports with local designs, and efforts to diversify

arms suppliers, while Pakistan's arms imports increased by 14 per cent. India wants its nuclear weapons for deterrence from its rival. According to the Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories data in Jan 2021, China and Pakistan were in third and sixth place, respectively, while India was in Seventh place (SIPRI, 2023). The alliance between China and Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons has been a massive threat to India's security. India's NFU policy commitment is being put under doubt because it is believed that in some parts of India, the nuclear arsenal is being kept in a state of very high readiness (SIPRI, 2023). The sole objective of India's nuclear weapons has been to protect its national interests and move the country towards the path of progress while remaining autonomous and self-reliant.

Conclusion

At times, some of the principles of Indian nuclear policy are considered idealistic rather than practical, especially principles like the NFU Policy. Many times, questions have been raised on the usefulness of the Indian nuclear policy regarding this principle. It is also true that India's nuclear doctrine gives importance to its traditional values. For example, India has never been in favour of making any country, especially its immediate neighbouring countries, uncomfortable based on its nuclear or physical power. As far as the principle of the NFU Policy is concerned, India has made it clear in its nuclear policy that a retaliatory attack for a nuclear attack on India would be extremely intolerable. This is a clear indication that the enemy nation will definitely have to think before attacking as to how much loss it might have to suffer in return if it fails.

However, India must continue to test and train the survivability of its nuclear forces so that an immediate and effective crisis management system can be established to launch a devastating retaliatory strike at any time. Military alliances like Pakistan and China are constantly posing threats to India's security. Regarding the attitude of nuclear nations towards non-nuclear nations, it can only be said that, in the current international circumstances, for any nation to depend on any external power for its own security would be putting its existence at stake.

At present, it would be beneficial for developing countries like India to ensure their self-security by clearly rejecting discriminatory treaties like the CTBT and NPT. Also, to establish peace and bring stability in the world, nuclear disarmament should be promoted, for which an international support system is needed. On this basis, Indian nuclear policy seems to be moving on two tracks simultaneously; on one hand, it is promoting its nuclear deterrence capability for defensive purposes and on the other hand, it is also continuously making efforts towards

complete disarmament. Along with this, Indian nuclear policy should pay more attention towards practicality and efforts are expected from India to bring more clarity by updating its nuclear policy as per the current international system.

Disclosure Statement:

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding:

The authors received no financial support for this research article, authorship or publication.

Declaration

This is to certify that the material embodied in the present work, entitled “Strategic Review: Unravelling the Dynamics of India’s Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century”, is based on my original research work. It has not been submitted for publication in part or whole in any other journal. The important references taken from different sources have also been duly cited.

Acknowledgement

I want to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Ramesh Kumar, Professor at the Department of Political Science, Central University of Haryana, who has provided me with intellectual and technical support at every level whenever I needed it.

References

- Das, P. (2015). Re-examining India's Nuclear Doctrine. *ORF Issue Brief*. 97. ORF. Retrieved from <https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230913184622.pdf>
- Dawn. (2016, Nov 12). *India, Japan sign civilian nuclear accord*. Retrieved from Dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1295849/india-japan-sign-civilian-nuclear-accord>
- Embassy of India, Washington, DC. (1999). *Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine*. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20000116163847/http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html
- GOI. (2010). *Paper Laid on the Table of the House on Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy*. PIB.

- GOI. (2010). *Paper Laid on the Table of the House on Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy*. PIB. Retrieved Jan 31, 2024, from https://media.nti.org/pdfs/32_ea_india.pdf
- Gopalaswamy, B. (2010, Jan). *India and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: to Sign or not to sign?* Retrieved from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/sipri-policy-briefs/india-and-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-sign-or-not-sign>
- IAEA. (2023). *IAEA Chief Meets Prime Minister Modi: Fostering India-IAEA Ties Across Diverse Sectors*. Retrieved from [iaea.org: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-chief-meets-prime-minister-modi-fostering-india-iaea-ties-across-diverse-sectors](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-chief-meets-prime-minister-modi-fostering-india-iaea-ties-across-diverse-sectors)
- Indian Express. (2019, Aug 17). *Explained: India's doctrine of Nuclear No First Use*. Retrieved from [Indianexpress.com: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-what-is-indias-doctrine-of-nuclear-no-first-use-5910820/](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-what-is-indias-doctrine-of-nuclear-no-first-use-5910820/)
- Joshi, M. (2022, Feb 22). *Reveal India's nuclear command structure*. Retrieved from [hindustantimes.com: https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/reveal-india-s-nuclear-command-structure-101645537229378.html](https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/reveal-india-s-nuclear-command-structure-101645537229378.html)
- Kanwal, G. (2016, June 30). *India's Nuclear Force Structure 2025. Carnegie Endowment for International*. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/indias-nuclear-force-structure-2025?lang=en>
- Laxman, S. (2023, June 24). *US reiterates support for India's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Times of India*. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-reiterates-support-for-indias-inclusion-in-nuclear-suppliers-group/articleshow/101225911.cms>
- Ministry of External Affairs. (n.d.). *IAEA*. Retrieved from [eoi.gov.in: https://eoi.gov.in/eoisearch/MyPrint.php?8838?001/0029#:~:text=India%20and%20the%20IAEA&text=Being%20a%20designated%20Member%2C,%2C%20UK%2C%20and%20the%20US](https://eoi.gov.in/eoisearch/MyPrint.php?8838?001/0029#:~:text=India%20and%20the%20IAEA&text=Being%20a%20designated%20Member%2C,%2C%20UK%2C%20and%20the%20US)
- NTI. (1987, April). *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)*. Retrieved from [nti.org: https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/](https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/)
- O'Donnell, F. (2020, March 26). *India's nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of. The Non-proliferation Review*, 26, 407-426. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1715018>
- PTI. (2018, June 12). *India insists signing NPT not needed for NSG membership*. Retrieved from [The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-insists-signing-npt-not-needed-for-nsg-membership/articleshow/52359392.cms?from=mdr](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-insists-signing-npt-not-needed-for-nsg-membership/articleshow/52359392.cms?from=mdr)
- Rajagopalan, R. (2016, June 30). *India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from

<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/indias-nuclear-doctrine-debate?lang=en>

Ramana, K. S. (2018, Feb 22). India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1*. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737>

Rediff. (2003, Jan 9). *Abandon no-first use policy, Security Board tells govt*. Retrieved from Exclusive to rediff: <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/ia/20030109.htm>

Sarkar, S. (2020, Oct 4). *India has 'no first use' of atomic weapons policy against nuclear armed*. Retrieved from hindustantimes.com: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-has-no-first-use-of-atomic-weapons-policy-against-nuclear-armed-states-shringla/story-tjPi4gFZvXbcM6Y17PjlPP.html>

Scroll Staff. (2016, Nov 10). *India should not bind itself to a 'no-first-use nuclear policy', says Manohar Parrikar*. Retrieved from Scroll.in: <https://scroll.in/latest/821251/india-should-not-bind-itself-to-a-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-says-manohar-parrikar>

SIPRI. (2023, March 13). *Surge in arms imports to Europe, while US dominance of the global arms trade increases*. Retrieved from sipri.org: <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/surge-arms-imports-europe-while-us-dominance-global-arms-trade-increases>

Thomson Reuters. (2014, April 16). *Narendra Modi says committed to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons*. Retrieved from ndtv.com: <https://www.ndtv.com/elections-news/narendra-modi-says-committed-to-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-557628>